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NOTE
PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND: A DECISION
WORTH NOTICING?
Mary Batch+
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause protects private property from
government appropriation by requiring governments to compensate
owners for land taken.' The Takings Clause is "a tacit recognition" of
governments' power of eminent domain,2 which allows governments to
take private property for public uses.3 In 1922, the Supreme Court

J.D. Candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation"). This prohibition on uncompensated takings has been
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 623 (1981) (citing Chicago, B., & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160
(1980)). Contra Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405-407 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Takings Clause does not apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
Debate over whether the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applies to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment may be considered largely moot because every state except
North Carolina and New Hampshire has constitutional provisions similar to the Takings
Clause in the U.S. Constitution. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS:
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

65 (1995).

These state takings clauses are not

redundant, however, because the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that property owners
seek remedies in the state courts before bringing claims in federal court. Williamson
County Reg'I Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95
(1985).
2.
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment's language is "a tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private
property for public use, rather than a grant of new power"). There is no grant of the
eminent domain power in the Constitution itself, as the power is considered to have
existed at common law before the ratification of the Constitution. See Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1876) (holding that the use of eminent domain by the government
was recognized well before the Constitution was ratified).
3.
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372. The Fifth Amendment imposes two requirements on the
government's exercise of its eminent domain power. First, the property must be taken for
a public use, which the Court has defined as any objective that is within the state's police
power. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984) (upholding Hawaii's use
of eminent domain to take property from large landowners and transfer it to tenants on
the land in order to effect a redistribution of real property in the state). Second, the
owner of the property must be given just compensation by the government. See United
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expanded the reach of the Takings Clause when it recognized that a

government regulation can diminish the economic value of land so much
that it effects a taking, giving the owner a legal right to compensation,
even though the government is not occupying the land physically. 4 By
expanding the Takings Clause, the Court provided a check on the state's
police power to regulate private property for the common good.5
When a landowner claims that a regulation diminishes the value of his
or her property so much that it effects a taking of private property for a
public use, the landowner may bring an inverse condemnation
proceeding against the appropriate government entity to demand

compensation. 6

Landowners

have

used

inverse

condemnation

States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 26 (1984) (holding that just compensation under
the Takings Clause consists of the fair market value at the time of the taking).
When a government decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, it must bring a
formal condemnation proceeding against the property, in which a court determines
whether the taking complies with the requirements of the Constitution. 27 AM. JUR. 2D
Eminent Domain § 474 (1996). The condemnation proceeding is not adversary; it serves as
notice to the property owner that the government is asserting title and possession of the
property. Id. § 475. The property owner in a condemnation proceeding does not seek to
prove a right to possession, but rather a right to compensation for the taking. Id.
4.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 360 U.S. 393,414-15 (1922). In many instances,
a government objective, such as preserving coastal wetlands, could be achieved through
eminent domain, but presumably seeking to avoid compensating each landowner, the
government instead regulates the land through its police power. See id. at 430
("Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.")
A state's police power is its inherent authority to make all laws necessary "to preserve
the public security, order, health, morality, and justice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1178
(7th ed. 1999). The Tenth Amendment formally recognizes and protects this power of the
states from federal infringement. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.") The use of the police power to regulate private
property generally has been upheld when the regulation serves a valid state purpose. See,
e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (upholding a zoning
ordinance as a valid exercise of state police power).
5.
See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (stating that the statute in question cannot
be upheld as an exercise of the state's police power).
6.
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1.980) ("Inverse
condemnation is 'a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers
just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not
been instituted."') (citation omitted); see also 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 826
(1996) (defining an inverse condemnation as an eminent domain proceeding initiated by
the property owner rather than the condemnor, deemed to be available when private
property has been taken for public use without formal condemnation proceedings). A
property owner may bring an inverse condemnation proceeding against a state
government or the federal government, under the state's constitution or under the U.S.
Constitution. Id.
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proceedings successfully to challenge newly enacted regulations,7 but
courts have been reluctant to allow landowners to challenge regulations
that were already in existence when they purchased or otherwise
acquired the land.s Using principles from the Supreme Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence, some courts developed a "notice rule,"
whereby landowners who have notice of the regulation affecting their
land cannot challenge it as a taking. 9
7.
See, e.g., Cooley v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 538, 554 (2000) (finding that a taking
existed where the federal government, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, denied plaintiffs'
permit to fill wetlands); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 42 (1999)
(finding that a mining company's land was taken when it was denied a mining permit
because of the subsequent enactment of the Clean Water Act); Garret v. City of Topeka,
916 P.2d 21, 35-36 (Kan. 1996) (holding that the city's traffic diversion plan effected a
taking of plaintiff's property because it blocked access and decreased the plaintiffs'
property value).
8.
See, e.g., Outdoor Graphics v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690,694 (8th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when the challenged
regulation prohibits a use already proscribed by existing laws); Namon v. State Dep't of
Envtl. Regulation, 558 So.2d 504, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (denying a takings claim
because landowners had actual and constructive notice that regulations might impede
their development plans); Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d
1035, 1039 (N.Y. 1997) (noting that a regulation forms part of the title to property as a preexisting rule of state law); City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414, 417-18 (Va. 1998)
(holding that the regulatory restriction was in the chain of title and therefore no taking
had occurred).
9.
See Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings "Notice Rule": Sources and
Implications, SF64 ALI-ABA 365 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 3, 2001). Still more
novel than customary, the term "notice rule" has appeared in fewer than forty law review
articles and sets of continuing legal education materials, and it has not appeared in the
case law. Id. at 367. Court opinions applying the notice rule typically use different
language but use the same theory to bar takings claims. See Robert Meltz, What Role
Does the Law Existing When a Property Is Acquired Have in Analyzing a Later Taking
Claim?: The "Notice Rule", SF64 ALI-ABA 381, 383 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 3,
2001). This Note will use "notice rule" for convienence.
Notice has traditionally been an important aspect of property law. Landowners are
assumed to have notice of any land-use regulations affecting their land. Namon, 558 So.2d
at 505 ("Appellants are deemed to purchase the property with constructive knowledge of
the applicable land use regulations."); 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 27 (1989) (stating that all
persons having property within a state must take note of the statutes affecting the control
or disposition of property). Therefore, when land is purchased, the owner takes with
"notice" of any regulation in place at that time. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 27 (1989) (noting
that one is charged with notice as to the time when a statute took effect). Similarly, the
notice rule applies when a landowner purchases land and holds it for some time before
subdividing it, and new regulations are in effect at the time of subdivision. See, e.g., Dist.
Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The
notice rule also applies when the land is acquired by operation of law rather than by
purchase. See, e.g., Bell, 498 S.E.2d at 415-16.
As Eagle conceives it, the notice rule is the result of a convergence of legal and
equitable constraints on property rights. Eagle, supra, at 2. The legal component is
derived from the background principles concept in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
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Two Supreme Court regulatory takings concepts led to the
development of the notice rule.'0

The first concept, the "reasonable

investment-backed expectations" of the landowner, is part of a balancing
test the Court developed to determine whether a private landowner is
unfairly bearing a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole."
Courts have held that when a landowner is aware of a regulation at the
time of purchase, that regulation cannot frustrate the reasonable
investment-backed expectations of a landowner, and therefore no taking
has occurred. 2

The second concept is based on the "background principles" of a
state's property law. 3 In 1992, the Supreme Court declared that a
regulation that deprives land of all economic value is a categorical taking

that requires compensation. The Court then created an exception to
this rule: if the landowner is prohibited from using the land in a manner
already limited by the background principles of the state's property law,
then a taking has not occurred even when all economic value has been

lost due to the regulation. 5 Some courts have understood a pre-existing

regulation to be part of these background principles and, therefore, have
held that the landowner never received the right to the desired
development at the time he acquired the land. 6 Some lower courts have
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and the equitable component from the reasonable
investment-backed expectations prong of Penn Central TransportationCompany v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Id. Courts applying the notice rule often consider it an
absolute defense to a takings challenge. Meltz, supra.
10. See generally Eagle, supra note 9.
11. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124,127 (1978).
12 See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship, 198 F.3d at 884 (noting that businesses
that operate in highly regulated industries can have no reasonable expectation that a
particular regulation will not be strengthened by further regulations); Good v. United
States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 109 (1997) (finding that the reasonable investment-backed
expectations concept limits recovery to property owners who can show their investments
were made in reliance upon the absence of the challenged regulations); Sucesion Suarez v.
Gelabert, 541 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (D.P.R. 1982) (holding that plaintiffs' investmentbacked expectations were unreasonable to the extent that they ignored the law of Puerto
Rico); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 937-38 (Tex. 1998) (ruling that
plaintiffs had no reasonable investment-backed expectations when the town's zoning
ordinances had limited the type of development sought for twelve years prior to the
plaintiffs' purchase of the property).
13. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
14. Id. at 1015-16.
15. See id. at 1027-29.
16. See, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994) (finding that at the
time plaintiffs acquired title to the land, the challenged regulation was in effect and
therefore the limitation on the use of the land inhered in the plaintiffs' title); Shell Island
Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 416 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (ruling that
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effectively barred an owner with notice of a regulation from challenging
it as a taking by relying upon the "reasonable investment-backed
expectations" theory and/or the "background principles" theory. 7
Courts applying the notice rule often couch their holdings in terms of
striking a fair balance between public and private interests. 8 In
developing its regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
grappled with balancing public and private interests so that individual
landowners do not unjustly bear burdens that should be distributed
among the public as a whole.' 9 Requiring the government to compensate
landowners when it takes land to serve a public purpose shifts the cost of
achieving that goal from the individual landowner to the public as a

whole.2"' On the other hand, the public should not have to compensate

because plaintiffs' land was subject to the challenged restrictions prior to their
development efforts, no taking occurred); City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414,
417-18 (Va. 1998) (holding that the regulatory restriction was in the chain of title and
therefore no taking occurred).
17. See, e.g., Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir.
1996) (explaining that an inquiry into the landowner's "bundle of rights" under Lucas
considers the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the landowner); Gazza v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1037, 1042 (N.Y. 1997),
(considering notice fatal to petitioner's claim under both Lucas and Penn Central). This
practice of the lower courts has stirred controversy among commentators, as takings law in
general is not considered one of the clearer areas of constitutional law. For general
commentary on the confusing state of Takings Clause jurisprudence, see, for example,
Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reformr A View from
the Trenches - A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 837 (1998); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995); Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not
the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Efforts To Formulate
Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAw. 307 (1998); James E. Krier, The
Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143 (1997).
1M See, e.g., Outdoor Graphics,103 F.3d at 695 (recognizing the need to balance the
city's interest in prohibiting certain billboards against claimant's economic interest in the
billboards).
19. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens, which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."); see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83 (1980).
20. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ("The determination that
governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at
large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest."). This cost-shifting occurs because when the government is forced to
compensate individual landowners, it presumably passes the cost along to the public
through taxes. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 139 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("The question in this case is whether the cost associated with
the city of New York's desire to preserve a limited number of 'landmarks' within its
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individual landowners who purchase regulated land at a bargain price
with the hope that they will be able to sell or develop the land later at a

higher price.2"
The Court's most recent takings law decision, Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island,22 addressed the balance between public and private interests

against the background of the notice rule.23 In Palazzolo, the Supreme
Court considered whether notice of a land-use regulation at the time of
acquisition bars the landowner from challenging the regulation.24 The
Court's holding suggests that notice of a pre-existing regulation cannot
be a per se bar to a takings claim. 25 However, because Palazzolo does
not provide guidance on the underlying substantive determination of
whether a taking occurred, the decision does little to guide lower courts
in the proper consideration of the landowner's interests vis-A-vis the
public interest. 26
In Palazzolo, the petitioner challenged a wetlands regulation that
severely limited the development permitted on his property. Anthony
Palazzolo owned parcels of coastal land in Rhode Island.? Before
Palazzolo obtained individual legal ownership of the property, the state
borders must be borne by all of its taxpayers or whether it can instead be imposed entirely
on the owners of the individual properties.").
21. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("The public may not by any
means confiscate the benefits, or be required to bear the burden, of the owner's
bargain."). In determining the just compensation for a taking, the landowner ought to be
returned to as good a position as he would have occupied had his property not been taken.
Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.C.
22. 533 U.S. 606 (2001.).
23. See id. at 626-30, 632-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 636-37 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
24. Id. at 618. The Court granted review to two other issues in Palazzolo.
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at i, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No.
99-2047). The three questions presented for review were: 1) Is a regulatory takings claim
categorically barred when the enactment of the regulation predates the claimant's
acquisition of the property?; 2) Must a property owner file additional applications seeking
approval for "less ambitious uses" of the land in order to ripen a takings claim when a
land-use agency has denied a particular use of the property?; and 3) When regulated
property retains a value greater than zero, are the remaining permissible uses of that
property necessarily economically viable? Id.
25. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (calling the notice rule "a blanket rule" that is "too
blunt an instrument" to apply to takings claims).
26. See id. at 629-30 (noting the state's argument that a pre-existing regulation can be
a background principle under Lucas but refusing to decide the issue).
27. Id. at 614-16.
28. Id. at 613-15. Palazzolo owned three undeveloped and adjoining parcels along
Atlantic Avenue, the main access road to a popular state beach. Id. at 613. The north side
of the property borders upon Winnapaug Pond, and the south side of the property faces
Atlantic Avenue, and beyond that the beach. Id. at 613-15.
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passed regulations that prohibited the filling of coastal wetlands without
a special exception from the state's Coastal Resources Management
Council." Over a period of years, Palazzolo applied for exceptions from
the Council to permit him to fill and develop his land6 His requests
were denied and he filed suit claiming that the Council's denial of his
1
application was a taking of his property without just compensation.
32
The trial court found for the state. Sitting without a jury, the judge
issued a thirteen-page decision ruling that Palazzolo's claim was not ripe
for judicial review and, in the alternative, that there was no taking to
support his claim.33 Palazzolo appealed, and the Supreme Court of
M
When the Rhode
Rhode Island affirmed the trial court's judgment.3
Island Supreme Court examined Palazzolo's claim, it relied on the
background principles of law concept to determine that even if Palazzolo
were denied all economic use of his property, there still would not be a
taking.35 Because the regulation was in existence when Palazzolo
obtained the land, the court held that his ownership of the land never
included the right to develop the wetlands. 6 The court briefly addressed
Palazzolo's investment-backed expectations and found that because the
regulations were in place before Palazzolo owned the property, he could
29. Id. at 614-15. In 1978, Palazzolo became the sole owner of property by operation
of state law. Id.; see also infra notes 151-53, 158-59, and accompanying text. The
challenged regulations, created by Rhode Island's Coastal Resources Management
Council, designated land such as Palazzolo's as wetlands subject to restricted
development. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614. To fill the wetlands so that the land could be
developed, regulations required Palazzolo to get a special exception from the Coastal
Resources Management Council. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047). The regulations further stated that a special
exception would only be granted if certain public interest requirements were met. Id.
30. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000). Palazzolo, acting
on behalf of his corporation, filed two permit applications in the 1960s, before he became
the individual legal owner of the property and before the state created the Coastal
Resources Management Council in 1971. Id. at 710. In March of 1983, Palazzolo sought
approval to build a bulkhead on the shore of Winnapaug Pond and to fill approximately
eighteen acres of the wetlands. Id. at 711. In January of 1985, Palazzolo applied to fill
wetlands so that he could build a beach club. Id.
31. Id.; see also discussion infra Part 1I for more on the facts of Palazzolo.
32 Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 711.
33. Id. at 711,714, 717.
34. Id. at 717.
35. See id. at 715. The Rhode Island court did not specifically refer to the regulations
as background principles of state law, but it cited similar language from the Supreme
Court case from which that concept originated. Id. The court noted: "The government
'may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his [or her] title to
begin with."' Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)).
36. Id.
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not have reasonably expected to develop the property and thus no taking
had occurred.37
Palazzolo appealed the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari." In a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court overturned the Rhode Island Supreme Court's holding
that notice of the regulation was fatal to Palazzolo's claim that he was
deprived of the economic value of his property.39 Justice Kennedy's
opinion noted the state court's reliance on both the background
principles of law concept and the investment-backed expectations
concept. '° However, Justice Kennedy wrote that the effect of the state
court's formulation amounted to "a single, sweeping, rule: [a] purchaser
or a successive title holder . . . [with] notice of an earlier-enacted
restriction ... is barred from claiming that it effects a taking., 41 The

Court said that such a rule would relieve the state of its obligation to
defend the validity of land-use regulations and would "put an expiration
date on the Takings Clause."42 The Court concluded that such a rule
would be too "capricious" to be sustained. 43
This Note explores the development of the notice rule and Palazzolo's
impact on it. First, this Note examines the Supreme Court's Takings
Clause jurisprudence and the development of the related notice rule.
Then, this Note discusses Palazzolo, focusing specifically on the Court's
attempt to define an investment-backed expectation and a background
principle of state property law. Finally, this Note demonstrates that
although the Palazzolo decision lifts the procedural bar of the notice
rule, it did not change the substantive law that determines when a taking
has occurred. As a result, the decision may do nothing more than
increase the number of takings claims filed without increasing the
number of cases in which a taking is actually found to have occurred. For
this reason, this Note suggests that further refinement of the role that
notice plays in takings jurisprudence is necessary.
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS AND NOTICE

Few Supreme Court cases directly address a property owner's ability to
challenge a regulation that was in effect prior to the date that the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 717.
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 531 U.S. 923 (2000).
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 610, 632 (2001).
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
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property was acquired."4 While many regulatory takings decisions do not
explicitly require notice as a factor in the takings analysis, some key cases
have left room for the lower courts to conclude that notice should play a
role.45
A. The Early Approach to Regulatory Takings
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Supreme Court first

recognized that government regulation can so severely impair the use of6
land that it has been "taken" in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes stated the general principle
underlying the notion of a regulatory taking: "[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking." 47 The Court concluded that the regulation in
question, which limited coal mining, had the effect of making it
"commercially impracticable" for the company to mine coal or use the
land at issue in any valuable way. 8 To the Court, the loss in economic
44. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987) (discussing the
effect of the landowners' constructive notice of a land-use requirement on their property
rights); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986) (finding that
a law regulating pension plans did not effect a taking, in part because pension plans had
long been regulated and employers were on notice that they might be further regulated);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1006 (1984) (ruling that notice of the statute
defeated Monsanto's Co.'s reasonable investment-backed expectations and defeated its
takings claim).
45. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). The impact of these cases on the development of the notice rule is discussed in
section I.A.
46. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
47. Id. at 415. In recognizing a regulatory taking, the Pennsylvania Coal Court noted
the balancing problem that future courts would struggle with in this context:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have
its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 414-15. The facts of Pennsylvania Coal do not present the typical inverse
condemnation situation where the plaintiff brings an action against the government,
alleging that a taking has occurred. See id. at 412-13. The plaintiffs in this case lived on
land under contract to the coal company. Id. at 412. The contract allowed the company to
remove coal from underneath the land, while the plaintiffs retained rights to the surface.
Id. The plaintiffs waived all claims for damages arising from the coal mining. Id. In 1921,
Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act, which prohibited the mining of coal in such a way
that would cause the subsidence of any structure used as a human habitation. Id. The
plaintiffs claimed the Kohler Act extinguished the coal company's right to mine the land
because such operations would cause unlawful subsidence of the surface. Id. at 412-13.
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value had the same effect as the government physically destroying or
otherwise appropriating the land.49
Pennsylvania Coal's regulatory taking concept expanded the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause from a defense against government

confiscation or invasion of private property to a much broader check on
the state's power to regulate private property. 0 In Armstrong v. United
States,51 the Court explained the rationale for this broader view of the
Takings Clause.52 The goal was to prohibit the government "from forcing

some people alone to bear public burdens, which in all fairness and
justice should be borne by the public as a whole. 5 3 Such language
implies that the court must balance the public interests against the
private interests to achieve an equitable result!" However, the Court did
not elaborate on the method by which this balance should be achieved.
Likewise, in Goldblatt v. Hempstead,55 the Court acknowledged that state
regulation can effect a taking 56 but again left lower courts without

Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the coal company, which was denied by the trial
court. Id. at 412. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, finding that the statute was
a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. Id. In Pennsylvania Coal, unlike in a
typical regulatory takings case, the plaintiffs were the ones seeking to have the regulation
upheld. Id.
49. Id. at 414. The dissent, written by Justice Brandeis, found that the law was not a
taking because it was a restriction imposed to "protect the public health, safety, or morals
from dangers threatened." Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.11 (4th ed. 1997).
Pennsylvania Coal is considered to be the first regulatory takings case. ld Before that
decision, the Court had not found a taking unless the government had physically invaded
or occupied the land. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 1-1, at 2 (1996).

Justice Holmes saw the case as one that probed the limits of the state's police power.
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (recognizing that the statute destroyed existing
property and contract rights and asking "whether the police power can be stretched so
far").
51. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
52 Id. Armstrong involved a shipbuilding corporation that defaulted on its contract
with the federal government. Id. at 41. Exercising an option in the contract, the
government forced the shipbuilder to transfer to the government the titles to the
unfinished boats and the materials on hand for the boats' construction. Id. This made it
impossible for the petitioners, suppliers to the shipbuilder, to assert their liens, which had

attached under state law to the boats and materials. Id.
53.

Id. at 49.

54.

See id. at 48 (suggesting that the government, in acquiring property for public use,

unfairly benefitted at the expense of the petitioners).
55. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Town of Hempstead enacted an ordinance regulating

dredging and pit excavating. Id. at 590. Appellants claimed that the regulations prevented
them from continuing business and therefore constituted a taking. Id. at 590-91.
56.

Id. at 592.
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concrete guidance on deciding takings claims, stating that "[t]here is no
set formula to determine where a regulation ends and taking begins."57
B. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York: The Court
Formulatesa Balancing Test
Fifty-six years after Pennsylvania Coal first recognized regulatory
takings,58 the Supreme Court provided a test to determine whether one
had occurred in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York.5 9
Penn Centralcentered around New York's Landmarks Preservation Law,
which required the owner of a designated landmark building to obtain
approval from a preservation commission before altering the building's
exterior.6° The commission had designated Grand Central a landmark.61
The owner sought the commission's approval to build a multi-story office
building on top of the terminal. 62 The commission denied the request
because the new construction would affect the aesthetics of the
terminal's facade. 6 . The terminal's owner brought suit, claiming that the4
Amendment.
commission's decision constituted a taking under the Fifth
Echoing the statement in Goldblatt that the line between a regulation
and a taking can be found through "no set formula," ' Justice Brennan's
majority opinion in Penn Central stated that the Court must decide
takings claims on a case-by-case basis, relying on "ad hoc, factual
inquiries." 66 The Court then identified three factors to consider when
determining whether a regulation has exceeded constitutional limits and
thus constitutes a taking. 67 First, a court must consider the regulation's
economic impact on the claimant. 6' Second, a court must evaluate the
regulation's interference with the owner's distinct investment-backed

57.

Id. at 594.

58. 260 U.S. 393; see also MANDELKER, supranote 50, at § 2.11.
59. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. Id. at 112. The Landmark Preservation Commission must approve alterations to
the exterior architectural features of the landmark and any construction for external
improvements to the landmark's site. Id. at 112. The commission's role was to consider
both the public's interest in the maintenance of the landmark and the landowner's interest
in the use of the property. Id.
61. Id. at 115-16.

62.

Id.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
6&

Id. at 117-18.
Id. at 119.
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
Id.
Id.
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expectations.6 9 Finally, a court must consider the "character of the
governmental action."7° The Court then ruled that New York's
landmarks law did not effect a taking of Penn Central's property.7'
Of the three Penn Central factors, the inquiry into the landowner's
investment-backed expectations is the one that most frequently
determines the outcome of a case. 2 The term "investment-backed
expectations" originated in an influential law review article by Harvard
University law professor Frank I. Michelman. 73 Michelman proposed a
69. Id. The Court cited Pennsylvania Coal as the leading case for the proposition that
a regulation may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations that it amounts to a
taking. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 138. The dissent focused on what it considered to be the unfair burden of
requiring Penn Central to bear the cost of the landmarks law. Id. at 148-49 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("If the cost of preserving Grand Central Terminal were spread evenly across
the entire population of the city of New York, the burden per person would be in cents per
year ....
Instead, however, appellees would impose the entire cost of several million
dollars per year on Penn Central.").
72. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 114 (1997) (finding plaintiff's lack
of reasonable investment-backed expectations to be "determinative of his takings
claims"); State of N.H. Wetlands Bd. v. Marshall, 500 A.2d 685, 690 (N.H. 1985)
(evaluating only defendants' "substantial, justified expectations" in deciding takings
claim); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 937 (Tex. 1998) (concluding that
plaintiffs had no reasonable investment-backed expectation to pursue planned
development and therefore the town did not unreasonably interfere with their ight to use
and enjoy the property). But see Dist. Intown Props. L'td P'ship v. District of Columbia,
198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1.999) (stating that there are three main factors to consider
under Penn Central); McNulty v. Town of Indialantic, 727 F. Supp. 604, 607 (M.D. Fla.,
1989) (applying "the three-factor Penn Central test" to plaintiff's claim).
The reasonable investment-backed expectations prong of the Penn Central test has also
received much attention from commentators. See generally William I. Gulliford, III, Note,
The Effect of Notice of Land Use Regulations Upon Investment-Backed Expectations and
Takings Challenges, 23 STETSON L. REV. 201 (1993); David Hymas, When Good Is Bad:
Good v. United States and Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 431 (2001); R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectationsin Regulatory
Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001); Robert M. Washburn, "Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations" as a Factorin Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 63 (1996).
73. Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1967).
Michelman's article has been a dominant force in the academic discussion of takings law.
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 141-42 ("No other area of constitutional law has such a durable
leading article."). Michelman's article is a philosophical exploration of takings law that
endorses a utilitarian approach to the issue. Id. at 142-44. According to Michelman, there
are three factors to consider when determining whether a compensable taking has
occurred: efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs. Id. at 144. These
terms have very distinctive definitions that are best expressed in Michelman's own
language. Id. Efficiency gains are the
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takings test that emphasized the nature of the property interest impacted
by government regulation, rather than one that limited the examination
to the extent to which the regulation diminished the property's value. 4
Although Justice Brennan incorporated the term into the Penn Central
majority opinion, he did not assign an explicit legal definition to

"investment-backed expectations.
The Court developed its own definition of Michelman's distinct

investment-backed expectations concept in subsequent cases. 76 Just one
7
year after Penn Central, the Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States
rephrased the Penn Central factors as "the economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed

expectations, and the character of the governmental action." 78 The use of
"reasonable" instead of "distinct" has significant implications. 79
excess of benefits produced by a measure over losses inflicted by it, where
benefits are measured by the total number of dollars which prospective gainers
would be willing to pay to secure adoption, and losses are measured by the total
number of dollars which prospective losers would insist on as the price of
agreeing to adoption.
Michelman, supra, at 1214. Demoralization costs are "(1) the dollar value necessary to
offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the
realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of
lost future production ... caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers .... " Id.
(footnote omitted). Settlement costs "are measured by the dollar value of the time, effort,
and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements
adequate to avoid demoralization costs." Id. Evaluation of these factors results in the
general rule that "[a]n imposition [upon property] is compensable if not to compensate
would be critically demoralizing; otherwise, not." Id. at 1213, 1215 (stating that under
utilitarian theory, compensation is due whenever demoralization costs exceed settlement
costs; if settlement costs, while lower than demoralization costs, are higher than efficiency
gains, the measure is improper regardless of compensation).
Investment-backed
expectations are a way to measure the property owner's expected suffering were the
taking not to be compensated and, as such, are a measure of demoralization costs. Id. at
1215-16, 1229-34.
74. Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 453 (citing Michelman's article).
According to Michelman, this is not a test of degree. "[I]t does not ask 'how much,' but
rather ... whether or not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically
deprived the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investmentbacked expectation." Michelman, supra note 73, at 1233.
75. Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 455; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978) (citing to pages 1229-34 and 1226-29 of
Michelman's article). For an analysis of the relationship between Michelman's article and
Justice Brennan's Penn Central opinion, see Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations:Is There a Taking? 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 10-13 (1987).
76. Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 460.
77. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
78. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
79. See Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 460.
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"Reasonable" implies an objective standard that requires the court to
determine whether a landowner's development expectations were within
reason given the circumstances - regardless of the landowner's actual
beliefs."' "Distinct" implies a subjective analysis, inquiring whether the
landowner took actions that evidenced his or her concrete expectations
regarding the economic potential of the land and whether those
expectations were adversely affected by the regulation. 8' This shift from
a subjective test to an objective test allowed the fact finder's analysis of
the reasonableness of the landowner's expectation of economic benefit as opposed to an analysis of the regulation's actual impact on the
landowner's expectations of economic benefit - to determine the
outcome. 8
In applying the Penn Central test, some lower courts incorporated the
landowner's notice of the regulation into the evaluation of the
reasonableness of the landowner's investment-backed expectations."
80. See id.; see also Washburn, supra note 72, at 67-71 (noting that "reasonable"
replaced "distinct" in later cases - possibly reflecting a shift to an objective standard,
which courts may define in various ways).
81. See Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 460. Alternately, Justice Brennan's
interpretation of "distinct" investment-backed expectations could be interpreted to mean
"well-defined" or "explicit." Washburn, supra note 72, at 67. Some courts still use the
term "distinct" investment-backed expectations. See, e.g., Szymkowicz v. District of
Columbia, 814 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D.D.C. 1993). In Penn Central, when looking at the
distinct expectations of the property owner, the Court noted that the landmarks law did
not interfere with the present and past use of the property as a railroad terminal and office
space and concluded that it did not interfere with Penn Central's primary expectation
regarding the use of the property. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
136 (1978).
82 See Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 460. Professor and real property
litigator Michael M. Berger has identified twelve factors that lower courts have used,
either alone or in combination, to determine whether a property owner's expectations are
reasonable:
(1) the severity and extensiveness of regulations at the time the property was
purchased; (2) the past regulatory history of the specific property; (3) the degree
of impairment of the uses of the property; (4) the uses available before
enactment of the challenged regulation; (5) the novelty or expectedness of the
governmental action; (6) whether specifically (and traditionally) recognizable
'sticks' were removed from the owner's bundle of property rights; (7) whether
any rights.., were substituted for those impaired; (8) whether existing uses were
permitted to continue; (9) whether government representations were formal or
informal; (10) the ability to sell the property to others at a fair price; (11) the
general power of government to regulate; and (12) the harshness of the local
regulatory and legal climate.
Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 765-67 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).
83. See supra note 12.
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For example, in Sucesion Suarez v. Gelabert,4 the District Court of
Puerto Rico considered the landowners' claim that the government's
denial of a permit to continue extracting sand from their land was a
taking.85 A Puerto Rico regulation required a special permit for the
extraction of sand.s6 The permit was temporary and could be revoked
upon finding that the extraction threatened the public interest. 87 The
landowners obtained these permits and mined sand from the property for
several years before the government denied a permit for their
operations.m The district court held that because the regulatory scheme
was in place one year prior to the plaintiffs' operations, they "should
have known ...that the operations they chose to conduct were subject to
constant regulation . . . . Whatever 'investment-backed expectations'
plaintiffs had in their land were unreasonable if they ignored the law of
Puerto Rico on the exploitation of natural resources."8 9 Thus, prior
notice of the regulation barred a successful regulatory taking claim. 9°
C. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto and Its Progeny: The Supreme Court's
Notice Rulings
Lower courts are not alone in holding that notice of a regulation can
defeat a claim of a regulatory taking because the property owner did not
have reasonable investment-backed expectations; the Supreme Court did
so in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.91 Monsanto dealt with the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which allowed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to publicly disclose data
submitted by an applicant for registration of a pesticide. 9' Such data

84.

541 F. Supp. 1253 (D.P.R. 1982).

85.

Id. at 1255.

86. Id. at 1259.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1256-58.
89. Id. at 1260 (citation omitted).
90. See id.
91. 467 U.S. 986,1013-14 (1984).
92. Id. at 990. Specifically, FIFRA required all pesticides to be registered with the
Department of Agriculture. Id. at 991. The process required the pesticide manufacturer
to submit information about the pesticide's manufacture and efficacy. Id. In 1972,
Congress amended FIFRA, requiring that the EPA determine that a pesticide would not
have adverse effects on the environment before the pesticide could be registered. Id. at
991-92. The EPA was prohibited from disclosing information that was considered to be
trade secrets. Id. at 992. Under certain circumstances, the EPA was allowed to consider
data submitted by an applicant for registration to support the registration of a subsequent
application. Id. at 992.
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included information that could be characterized as trade secrets.93

Monsanto, a manufacturer of pesticides, sued on the theory that the data94
disclosing provisions of FIFRA authorized a taking of private property.
The Supreme Court first determined that Monsanto had a property
interest in the data it submitted to the EPA.95 In applying the Penn
Central factors to the case, the Monsanto Court focused its entire analysis
on the investment-backed expectations prong because it found the force
of that factor to be "overwhelming." '' In addition, the Court found that
with respect to any data Monsanto submitted after the relevant FIFRA
provisions went into effect, Monsanto could not have had a reasonable,
investment-backed expectation that the EPA would keep the data

confidential.7 In the Court's opinion, Monsanto had notice of the
manner in which the EPA could use the data and therefore was barred
from claiming that a taking had occurred.98 The Court further held that
Monsanto had no reasonable expectation that data submitted before the
regulation went into effect would be kept confidential because the
"possibility was substantial that the Federal Government ... would find

disclosure to be in the public interest."' Thus, the Monsanto Court
found that Monsanto had notice of the regulations because there was a
general regulatory scheme in this area that was subject to change as the
government deemed necessary.03 Although Monsanto and subsequent
Supreme Court case law applied this constructive notice rule in cases
93. Id. at 998.
94. Id. at 999. Unlike other cases discussed up to this point, Monsanto involved a
claim that personal property - specifically trade secrets - was being taken by the
government. Id. Although this Note primarily discusses real property, the Fifth
Amendment's Taking Clause applies equally to personal property, and there have been
many regulatory takings claims alleging a taking of personal property. See, e.g., Vesta Fire
Ins. Corp. v. Florida, 141 F.3d 1427 (11th Cir. 1998) (involving a taking claim as a result of
an insurance regulation); Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690 (8th
Cir. 1996) (involving a taking claim challenging a regulation that prohibited billboards);
Rudolph v. Cuomo, 916 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (considering inmates' challenge to
changes in prison regulations involving wages and fines); Student Loan Marketing Assoc.
v. Riley, 907 F. Supp. 464 (D.D.C. 1995) (considering a takings challenge to a regulation
that imposed a fee on certain student loans),
95. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
96. Id. at 1005.
97. Id. at 1006.
98. Id. at 1007 ("Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under which
the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate
Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the
economic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a taking.").
99. Id. at 1008-09.
100. See id. at 1.007 (noting that the pesticide industry has long been subject to
government regulation).
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dealing with personal property, 1 ' some lower courts have extended the
notion of constructive notice to real property."
Subsequent Supreme Court interpretation in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission °3 limited the Monsanto constructive notice rule to
takings of personal property.' 4 In Nollan, the landowners applied for a

permit to replace the residence on their coastal property."5 The
California Coastal Commission conditioned the issuance of a permit
upon the landowners' conveying an easement to the state that would
allow for public passage on the beachfront portion of their property."
The California Court of Appeals upheld the commission's demand for an
easementW Despite the fact that the commission had imposed similar
conditions on forty-three of the Nollans' neighbors, effectively putting
the Nollans on notice of the easement requirement, the Supreme Court
reversed the California court."
In a footnote, Justice Scalia's majority opinion distinguished Monsanto
from Nollan.'" Monsanto involved the right to a conditional government
benefit dependent on the registration of pesticide, whereas Nollan
involved a condition on the right to build on one's own property - a

101. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (holding that legislation reducing
child support benefits was foreseeable and thus did not effect a taking); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (holding that a federal statute that
increased the liability provisions of a pension fund did not effect a taking given that the
fund's trustees could have anticipated the new financial obligations).
102. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 884
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that the real estate business has a history of being regulated "for
the purpose of preserving historic sites"); Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 112-13
(1997) (finding no frustration of reasonable investment-backed expectations where a
developer continued to invest in development in the face of growing regulatory
limitations); State Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1000 n.4 (Colo. 1994)
(applying Monsanto to a case involving real property because the property became subject
to "tight controls more analogous to personal property regulation than to the limited
levels of regulation traditionally applied to real property").
103. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
104. Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 467; see also Bowles v. United States, 31
Fed. C. 37, 50 n.15 (1994) (discussing the Nollan footnote and stating that "one could
argue that prior 'notice' has no relevance in cases involving land use regulations"); Hymas,
supra note 72, at 452 n.119; Tom Pierce, Comment, A Constitutionally Valid Justification
for the Enactment of No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population
Stabilization and Sustainability,19 HAw. L. REv. 93, 141 n.306 (1997).
105. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 830.
108. Id. at 842, 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 833-34 n.2.
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right afforded a higher level of protection." ° The Court found it
irrelevant that the Nollans acquired the land after the commission began
to require the easements, stating that "[s]o long as the [c]ommission
could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without
compensating them, the prior owners must be understood to have
1
transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot. I'
Commentators point to this language when arguing that Nollan limits
Monsanto to personal property because Nollan implies that a
landowner's right to challenge a regulation as a taking transfers with title
to a subsequent landowner."2 However, the Court did not overrule
Monsanto outright."' The fact that the distinction between Nollan and
Monsanto was relegated to a footnote shows that the Supreme Court did
not intend to be explicit on this point." 4 Even after Nollan, lower courts
continued to find notice a dispositive factor in15 determining a landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.'

D. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission: The Court Recognizes
a New Kind of Taking

Before 1992, there had been two types of regulatory takings: one in
which a regulation caused a loss of value in the property, analyzed
according to Penn Central, and another in which a regulation caused a
physical occupation of the land."6 The second type is considered a
categorical taking, meaning that once a physical invasion of the property
is found, the inquiry ends, and the property owner is entitled to
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
Id.
See, e.g., Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 469.
See id. at 468-69.
Cf Louis LUSKY, OUR NINE TRIBUNES, THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN
AMERICA 119-20 (1993).
115. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 883
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 109 (1997); Sucesion Suarez v.
Gelabert, 541 F. Supp. 1253 (D.P.R. 1982); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d
922, 937-38 (Tex. 1998).
116. See supra notes 46-48, 59-62, and accompanying text. The first kind is the type of
regulatory taking established by Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
and subsequently analyzed according to Penn Central. See supra notes 46-48, 59-62, and
accompanying text. The second type, where a regulation causes a physical occupation of
the land, was considered by the Court to be more akin to a traditional physical taking by
the government. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (stating that "we have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a
property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause"
in a case where a government regulation authorized a physical intrusion on the property
owner's land).
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compensation.117 The Court addressed this bright-line rule in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,118 holding that any physical
occupation constituted a per se taking regardless of the breadth of
physical occupation authorized by the regulation.11 9 The Court's finding
of a categorical taking in the economic context was presaged in Agins v.
City of Tiburon.12 In Agins, the Court found that "[t]he application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance
..denies an owner economically viable use of his land., 12' The Court
would later cite this language when it recognized a new type of
categorical taking based on a loss of all economic value 22
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,l 3 the Court declared a per
se taking when a regulation denies an owner all economically viable use
of his land." Lucas involved a regulation barring permanent habitable
structures in the state's coastal area. 5 Petitioner Lucas owned two
residential lots on a South Carolina barrier island upon which he
26
intended to build single-family homes similar to others on the island.'
At the time of his purchase, the challenged regulation did not exist, and
his property was not subject to the state's coastal building permit
requirements. 27 When Lucas challenged the regulation as a taking, the
trial court found that the regulation rendered the lots valueless and
117. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (identifying
"regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property" as a category of regulatory action that requires compensation without casespecific inquiry).
118. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). In Loretto, the Court held that a New York law requiring
landlords to allow cable companies to put cable facilities in their apartment buildings was
a taking. Id. at 435-40. The cable facilities occupied no more than 1.5 cubic feet of the
buildings. Id. at 438 n.16.
119. Id. at 435-40.
120. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
121. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
122. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. Although the Court cited Agins as the source of the
Lucas rule, the concept of a categorical taking in the economic context is generally
considered to have been established for the first time in Lucas. Brittany Adams, Note,
From Lucas to Palazzolo: A Case Study of Title Limitations, 16 J.LAND USE & ENVTL.
LAW 225, 232 (noting that it is not clear that Agins supports the Lucas rule); see also
Meltz, supra note 9, at 388 (describing Lucas as introducing the "total takings" concept).
Most notably, although the Lucas Court referred to a regulation that denies "all
economically beneficial" uses of the land, the cited portion of the Agins opinion does not
use the word "all." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015,1019; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.

123. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
124. Id. at 1016, 1019.
125. Id. at 1007.
126. Id. at 1008.

127. Id.
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ordered that Lucas be compensated."" The South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed, but the U.S. Supreme Court deemed the trial court's
finding that the land had no economic value dispositive and established
the categorical taking rule. 29 Under this rule, when a regulation deprives
land of all "economically beneficial or productive use," it is a regulatory

taking requiring compensation without "case-specific inquiry into the
public interest advanced in support of the restraint," meaning that the
Court will not consider the particular facts of the case in light of the
public purpose that the regulation is supposed to serve.130
The Lucas rule stands independent from the Penn Central takings
analysis. 3' If a Lucas categorical taking is found to exist, compensation is
automatic; it is not dependent on the Penn Centralfactors.'32 Conversely,
if a categorical taking is not found under Lucas, the landowner may still
be compensated under Penn Central.'33 Thus, the Lucas Court created

two types of takings based on a reduction of economic value 3
Regulations that deprive the land of all economic use are a per se or
categorical taking, and compensation is automatic. 3' Regulations that
leave some economic value effect a partial taking, and the right
to
36
compensation is determined by applying the Penn Central factors.

Lucas also created an exception to its categorical takings rule. 37 When
a regulation deprives land of all economic value, it will not be considered

a taking if the regulation prohibits uses that would be prohibited anyway
128. Id. at 1009.
129. See id. at 1015-16, 1020-22, 1026-32. The Court described such a value-depriving
regulation as a "confiscatory regulation." Id. at 1029.
130. Id. at 1015. For an example of a categorical taking under Lucas, see Cooley v.
United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 538, 547 (2000) (finding that a permit denial that destroyed 98.8
percent of the property's value was a "categorical taking" under Lucas).
131. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
132- See id.
133. See id.; Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(stating that the consequence of concluding that no categorical taking had occurred was
that the plaintiff had to prove it had investment-backed expectations in order to claim
there was a taking); Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874,
877 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's finding that plaintiff did not establish a
"total taking" under Lucas, nor did plaintiff show that its investment-backed expectations
were frustrated).
134. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 1027 ("Where the state seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with.").
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by the "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already [in] place upon land ownership."' Applied to the facts in Lucas,
the regulation would not be a taking if South Carolina could "identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the
uses [Lucas] intends in the circumstances in which the property is
'
presently found."139
If the government can make this showing, then a
court cannot find that a regulation takes anything new from the
landowner."9
The scope of the background principles exception to the Lucas rule is
unclear because the Court did not explicitly identify the source(s) of
these background principles of property and nuisance law. 41 Although
Lucas seems to imply that the common law is the proper source of these
principles, many lower courts have considered land-use regulations to be
background principles.'42 For example, in City of Virginia Beach v.
Bell,43 the Virginia Supreme Court found a background principle

13& Id. at 1029-30.
139. Id. at 1031-32. On remand, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that the
Coastal Council did not have the ability under common law to prohibit Lucas from
building on his land. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C.
1992). The South Carolina Supreme Court then remanded the case to the circuit court
because finding that the regulation effected a taking gave Lucas a cause of action for the
temporary deprivation of the use of his property. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the sole issue for the circuit court was the actual damages Lucas sustained as a
result of being temporarily deprived of the use of his property. Id.
140. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32.
141. See id. at 1027-28. Although the Court did not explicitly define the principles that
can limit the property owner's rights, the Lucas decision hinted at what constitutes a
background principle of state property or nuisance law. Some possible characteristics of a
background principle are: it inheres in the title itself, id. at 1029; it arises under the state's
law of private nuisance, id.; it arises under the state's power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, id.; it is a result that could have been achieved in the courts by
adjacent landowners, id.; it is a particular use long engaged in by similarly situated
landowners, id. at 1031; it is a common-law prohibition or principle, id. Toward the end of
the opinion, the Court stated that the inquiry under Lucas would require analysis of,
among other things,
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property,
posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the social value of the claimant's
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm [could] be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government.
Id. at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
142. See, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994) (finding regulations
that were in existence ten years before the land was purchased to be part of the state's
property law); Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 315-16 (N.Y. 1997) (explicitly
refusing to limit the background principles concept to the common law).
143. 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998).
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exception to the Lucas rule. 144 The court interpreted Lucas as requiring
that South Carolina prove its regulation was based on principles of
nuisance and property law only because Lucas had taken title to the land
prior to the enactment of the regulation.' 45 The court went on to find that
because the Virginia regulation predated the Bells' acquisition of the
land, it was possible to define the regulation as a background principle of
the state's property law and find that there was no taking.' 6 The court's
decision was not framed in terms of whether the Bells had notice of the
regulation because it was not examining whether the Bells had

reasonable investment-backed expectations.4 4 However, the result is
similar to those cases where a court finds that notice of a regulation
defeats investment-backed expectations. In both situations, courts
determine that, because a regulation existed before the landowner
obtained the property, the regulation cannot be challenged as a taking as
4
a matter of law.' "

II. PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND: THE COURT TAKES NOTICE OF
NOTICE

In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo invested in three undeveloped, adjoining
parcels of coastal land in Rhode Island. 49 The land was wetlands subject
to tidal flooding and required considerable filling before it could be
144. Id. at 416-18. In Bell, the land in question passed to the Bells as individuals from
a corporation they had partially owned. Id. at 415. Between the time that the corporation
owned the land and the time that ownership passed to the Bells, the city passed the
ordinance restricting dune development, which affected the Bells' land. Id. Like
Palazzolo, the Bells succeeded to the interest in their land after the regulation was
enacted, but they had an interest in the land's development before the regulation was
enacted. For discussion of the facts in Palazzolo, see infra notes 149-61 and accompanying
text.
145. Bell, 498 S.E.2d at 417-18; accord Hunziker, 519 N.W.2d at 371 (noting the
"important distinction" between the Lucas case, where the regulation was passed after
plaintiffs acquired title, and Hunziker, where the regulations existed before plaintiffs
acquired title); Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 314-15 (maintaining that "in identifying the
background rules of State property law that inhere in an owner's title, a court should look
to the law in force, whatever its source, when the owner acquiredthe property") (emphasis
added).
146. Bell, 498 S.E.2d at 417-18.
147. Id. at 417. Bell only sought relief for a categorical taking under Lucas, claiming
that the denial of the permit eliminated the property's only economically beneficial use.
Id. The court did not examine the claim under Penn Central and therefore did not address
investment-backed expectations. See id.
148. Compare Bell, 498 S.E.2d at 417-18, and Hunziker, 519 N.W.2d at 371, with
Sucesion Suarez v. Gelabert, 541 F. Supp. 1253 (D.P.R. 1982), and Dist. Intown Props.
Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874,882 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
149. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,613 (2001).
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developed. 150 Palazzolo and his associates formed Shore Gardens, Inc.
(SGI) to purchase and hold the property. 151 Palazzolo eventually bought
51 2
out his associates and became the sole shareholder in the corporation.
Between 1959 and 1966, SGI subdivided the property and submitted
applications to state agencies to fill large portions of the property.'53
These applications were eventually denied, and SGI did not contest the
rulings.
Palazzolo did not attempt to develop the property again until 1983.55
However, two important intervening events occurred in the meantime.
First, in 1971, Rhode Island enacted legislation creating the Coastal
Resources Management Council, the purpose of which was to protect the
state's coastal land. 56 The Council enacted regulations greatly restricting

150. Id. at 613-14. Generally, wetlands are land areas that are either permanently or
PAUL D. CYLINDER, ET AL., WETLANDS REGULATION: A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA PROGRAMS 1 (1995). Examples of wetlands
include marshes, bogs, and tidal areas. NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA,

seasonally wet.

PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 43 (1997). Wetlands protect against erosion, control flooding, and filter

pollutants that would otherwise enter the nation's waterways. Id. However, human
activity has greatly reduced the amount of wetlands covering the country, and by some
estimates, fifty-three percent of the wetlands in the forty-eight contiguous states has been
lost over the last 200 years. CYLINDER, supra, at 12. Most wetlands loss is due to
conversion to farms, urban development, flood control projects, and water diversion
projects. Id. at 17.
151. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 613. The property acquired by Palazzolo and his
corporation between 1959 and 1969 cost a total of $13,000. Brief of Amici Curiae
California, et al. at 1, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047).
152. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 613.
153. Id. at 613-14.
154. Id. at 614.

155. Id.
156. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 710-11 (R.I. 2000). The
legislation is codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23 (1996). Section 46-23-18 prohibits the
dredging of coastal land without a permit:
(b) No person, either as principal, agent, or servant, or any firm, corporation or
any other entity, shall within the tidal waters of the state, conduct or cause to
conduct dredging, transportation and/or disposal of dredge materials without a
permit issued by the coastal resources management council, a water quality
certification issued by the department of environmental management pursuant to
chapter 12 of this title and any permit required by the army corps of engineers.
In addition, no person, either as principal, agent or servant, nor any firm,
corporation or any other entity, shall dispose of dredge materials other than in
tidal waters without any permit, approval or certification that may otherwise be
required.
Id. § 46-23-18.
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development on coastal wetlands like the land owned by SGI. s7 Second,
8
in 1978, SGI's corporate charter was revoked for failure to pay taxes. 1
Title to the property passed to Palazzolo because he was SGI's sole
shareholder.159 When Palazzolo revived efforts to develop the property
in 1983, he submitted requests similar to those denied in the 1960s.' 6
The Council denied the requests, citing regulations that allowed land like
161
Palazzolo's to be filled only under special circumstances.
After unsuccessfully appealing the Council's decision in court,' 62
Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior
Court. 63 Palazzolo claimed that the Council's denials had deprived the64
property of all economic value, resulting in a total taking under Lucas.'
After a bench trial, the judge ruled against Palazzolo.' 65
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. 66 Addressing
the impact of Palazzolo's notice of the regulation on his takings claim,
157. See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710-11.
The Coastal Resources Management
Council's regulations required a permit to fill coastal wetlands. Id. Section 130(A) of the
Coastal Resources Management Program states:
A. Special exceptions may be granted ... only if and when the applicant has
demonstrated that:
(1) The proposed activity serves a compelling public purpose which provides
benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to individual or private interests.
The activity must be one or more of the following: (a) an activity associated with
public infrastructure such as utility, energy, communications, transportation
facilities; (b) water-dependent activity that generates substantial economic gain
to the state; and/or (c) an activity that provides access to the shore for broad
segments of the public.
Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 4, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No.
99-2047) (noting that the implementing regulations are published in the State of Rhode
Island Coastal Resources Management Program).
15& Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710-11.
159. Id. at 710. Despite the fact that Palazzolo had, for practical purposes, been the
sole owner of the land since he bought out his SGI associates, he never challenged the
assertion that the regulations predated his acquisition of the property. See Steven J.
Eagle, Recent Developments in Wetlands Regulations: Waiting for Palazzolo, SF92 ALIABA 191, 194 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, May 31,2001).
160. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614.
161. Id. at 614-15. Under Council regulations, Palazzolo needed a "special exception"
from the Council to fill his land. Id. at 615. A special exception would only be granted
when the proposed development benefitted the public as a whole as opposed to serving
individual or private interests. Id.
162. Id. Palazzolo challenged the Council's decision as contrary to principles of state
administrative law. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 615-16.
165. Id. at 616.
166. Id.

2003]

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: A Decision Worth Noticing?

505

the court held that Palazzolo had no right to challenge regulations that
were enacted before he acquired the property. 67 The court examined
Palazzolo's claim under both Lucas and Penn Central.1' The court cited
Lucas for the proposition that there cannot be a taking when a regulation
denies a use that was not originally part of the owner's title.' 69 The court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the right to fill the wetlands was not
part of Palazzolo's estate because the regulations limiting that right were
already in place when he acquired the property. 70 Under the Penn
Centraltest, the court again agreed with the trial court's finding and held
that in light of the Council's regulations, Palazzolo could not have
reasonably expected to develop the property as he had planned. 7' The
court found Palazzolo's lack of reasonable investment-backed
expectations dispositive and did not consider the other Penn Central

factors.1 2 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part
the Rhode Island Supreme Court's ruling.173
A. The Majority OpinionRejects a Per Se Notice Rule

After finding that Palazzolo's takings claim was ripe for adjudication,'
the majority opinion addressed the state court's finding that notice of the
regulation defeated Palazzolo's takings claim. 75

Justice Kennedy

characterized the state court's holding on the notice issue as amounting
to "a single, sweeping rule' 7 6 that, if accepted, would allow states "to put
167. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court also held that Palazzolo's claim was not
ripe for review and that his claim for deprivation of all economically beneficial use of the
property was contradicted by evidence that there was still development value in a parcel of
upland property. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714-15 (R.I. 2000).
16& Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 712-13.
169. Id. at 715-16.
170. Id. at 715-27.
171. Id. at 717.
172 Id. Some commentators argue that state courts have tended to favor regulation
more so than federal courts.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITS

ON

See

ROBERT MELTZ, ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE:
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAND
USE CONTROL AND

375 (1999). State courts generally allow "modest residual uses" to defeat a
landowner's claim of a total taking under Lucas and require a loss of virtually all economic
use of the parcel under the frustration of investment-backed expectations principle. Id.
173. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616. The Court reversed the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's ruling that Palazzolo's claim was not ripe and also reversed the holding that
Palazzolo could not challenge regulations predating his acquisition of the land. Id. The
Court affirmed the state court's finding that there was no categorical taking under Lucas
and remanded for further proceedings under Penn Central. Id
174. Id. at 616-26.
175. Id. at 626.

REGULATION

176. Id.
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an expiration date on the Takings Clause."' 77 The majority found such a
notice rule inherently unfair.1 78 An inverse condemnation proceeding

imposes upon the state a duty to justify a land-use regulation. 79 A rule
barring a property owner from challenging a regulation because it was
enacted before the owner acquired the property would relieve the state
of its duty to justify the regulation, simply because the property had
changed hands, no matter how extreme or unreasonable the regulation.'18
According to the Court, the rule was also "capricious in effect" and
"quixotic" because landowners would be treated differently depending

upon their circumstances.

81

For example, because an inverse

condemnation action cannot be brought until a claim is ripe,1 2 the Court
reasoned that a notice rule unfairly punishes a current landowner "where

the steps necessary to make the claim ripe were not taken, or could not
have been taken, by a previous owner.""' As a result, a notice rule
would put current landowners in different positions based on the action
or inaction of previous landowners."
The majority relied upon Nollan as controlling precedent for its
holding) 85 The Court cited Nollan for the proposition that notice of a
regulation is not sufficient to defeat a takings claim if the underlying

regulation does indeed effect a taking of land.1 6 The majority disputed
the argument that Lucas' discussion of background principles of property
177. Id. at 627.
178. Id. at 628 ("It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim
because of post-enactment transfer of ownership."); see also id. at 627 (stating that "[tihe
state may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle").
179. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
180. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. Other courts have expressed similar concerns. See,
e.g., Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 726, 735 (1996) ("Congress
could pass a law that stated that no one could build on their [sic] property. After all
property had passed hands once, the right to build on one's property would be lost to
everyone.").
181. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (noting the different positions of "[t]he young owner
contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the resources to hold [the land]
contrasted with the owner with the need to sell").
182. See id. at 627 (implying that the case demonstrates that the ripeness process can
take years). For a discussion of ripeness, see infra note 201.
183. Id. at 628.
184. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
186. Id. The relevant language from Nollan states: "So long as the Commission could
not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them, the prior
owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the
lot." Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1986); see also supra notes
103-15 and accompanying text.
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law limited the Nollan holding by incorporating a consideration of preexisting regulations into the takings test.' While the majority refused to
decide when a law can be deemed a background principle of state law, it
recognized that a law does not become a background principle by
enactment alone.'8 The Court reasoned that fairness demanded this
view of the background principles concept because a law cannot be a
background principle for some landowners and not for others.189
B. The Concurrences:Differing Opinions on Notice
While the majority opinion barely touched on the state court's
evaluation of the claim under Penn Central,'90 Justice O'Connor's
concurrence dealt with precisely that question. T9 O'Connor stated that, in
her opinion, the Court's Palazzolo holding does not mean that notice is
irrelevant in a Penn Central analysis. 92 She began with the proposition
that courts are in error when they find the investment-backed
expectations prong of Penn Central to be dispositive of a claim.' 93
O'Connor urged that Penn Central requires consideration of all three
factors in evaluating a partial taking claim.1 94 According to O'Connor,
when considering investment-backed expectations, "the state of
regulatory affairs at the time of acquisition is not the only factor."'95
Justice O'Connor dismissed the notion that it is not a factor at all, stating
that the Court's decision in Palazzolo does not remove the notice aspect
from a Penn Central analysis but "simply restores balance to that
187. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629 ("It is asserted here that Lucas stands for the
proposition that any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a background principle of
property law which cannot be challenged by those who acquire title after the
enactment.").
188. Id. at 629-30 ("It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of
the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title."). The Court described the
background principles concept as those "common, shared understandings of permissible
limitations derived from a State's legal tradition." Id. at 630.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 630, 632.
191. Id. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The more difficult question is what role
the temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition plays in a
proper Penn Central analysis.").
192, Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193. See id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Investment-backed expectations,
though important, are not talismanic under Penn Central.").
194. Id.
195. Id. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested that the
extent of the development permitted, in contrast to the extent of development sought by
the claimant, is another factor to be considered in investment-backed expectations. Id.
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The relevant facts and circumstances dictate the amount of

weight that each factor should be given.""
Although Justice Scalia concurred in the majority opinion, he
specifically disagreed with Justice O'Connor's understanding of the
notice issue. 98 According to Scalia, a pre-existing land-use regulation
should not have any role in determining whether a taking has occurred.' 99

He reasoned that the determination of whether a taking has occurred
should not depend upon the transfer of title but on the validity of the
restriction that deprives the individual of full use of the land.2"°
C. The Dissenting Opinions: Ripeness, Standing, and a Mention of Notice

Justice Ginsburg's dissent, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter,
argued that Palazzolo's claim was not ripe for adjudication and that the
merits of the case were not properly presented. 0 ' Believing that the
196. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19& Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I write separately to make clear that my
understanding of how the issues . . . must be considered on remand is not Justice
O'Connor's.").
199. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. See id. Scalia excludes from this statement a restriction that forms part of the
background principles described in Lucas. See id.
201. See id. at 647-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ginsburg's main contention was that
Palazzolo did not take the steps necessary to ripen his takings claim. Id. at 646-47.
Ripeness is a procedural bar to bringing a takings claim in federal courts. See
MANDELKER, supra note 50, at 40-41. Requirements must be met before a takings claim
becomes ripe, including submitting any information the regulation requires for
development approval, such as a development plan, and the issuing of a final judgment
from the state court. Id at 41. The state court determined that Palazzolo failed to meet
two ripeness requirements. First, the government entity responsible for implementing the
challenged regulation had not reached a final decision as to the application of the
regulations to Palazzolo's property. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714
(2000) (noting that Palazzolo claimed a taking because he was denied permission to
develop a subdivision, but that none of his permit applications sought permission to build
a subdivision). Second, after being denied approval for his development plan, Palazzolo
did not seek permission for less ambitious uses before filing a takings claim. Id. (noting
that Palazzolo never sought permission for less ambitious plans for the wetlands or for
plans to develop his upland property).
Central to Justice Ginsburg's argument that the merits of the case were not properly
presented at the state level was the fact that Palazzolo only asserted a Lucas-based claim,
but then, at the Supreme Court, he also argued that there was a taking under Penn
Central. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 650-51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Therefore, the record
reflected only the state's defense against a Lucas claim, where the state demonstrated that
Palazzolo had not sought to develop the upland parcel, which retained an economically
beneficial use. Id. at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg found the majority's rejection of the state court's findings on ripeness
"inaccurate and inequitable." Id. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She called the ruling
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Court should not have reached the merits of the case, Justice Ginsberg
did not address the issue of notice in the body of her opinion; she did,
however,
• • 202 give a glimpse of her view in a footnote at the end of her
In the footnote, Ginsburg stated that she would, "at a
opinion.
minimum," agree with Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer that
notice can play a role in a takings analysis. 23
Justice Breyer also thought that Palazzolo's claim was not ripe for
adjudication, but his dissent directly addressed the notice issue.2°4 Breyer
agreed with O'Connor that the existence of a regulation before the time
of acquisition should not be dispositive in a takings analysis. 2 5 Breyer
urged consideration of how the timing and circumstances of a change in
ownership after the enactment of a regulation affect the reasonable
investment-backed expectations of the new landowner.2 0 Breyer stated
over time,
that these expectations diminish as property changes hands
2
0
and Penn Central allows for consideration of this tendency.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.2°8 He agreed
with the majority's opinion that Palazzolo's claim was ripe for
notice. 20
adjudication but dissented from the Court's discussion of
According to Stevens, Palazzolo had no standing to demand
compensation for a taking, but he could have sought to enjoin the
enforcement of the land-use regulations.210 If the regulations effected a
taking, it was a taking of SGI's property because SGI was the owner of

inaccurate because, in her view, the record was ambiguous as to whether, and to what
extent, development of the upland parcel of land was possible. Id. at 654 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting conflicting opinions about the possible extent of development). She
called the ruling inequitable because, given that Palazzolo's claim at the state level was
based on a deprivation of all economic value, Rhode Island only had to establish that
development of the land was possible, but the state did not have to show the extent of
possible development. Id. ("Ambiguities ... persist in part because their resolution was
not required to address the claim Palazzolo presented below."). According to Ginsburg,
by finding Palazzolo's claim ripe for adjudication and allowing him to argue that a Penn
Central taking occurred, the Court turned the state's legitimate defense against Palazzolo's
original Lucas claim into a weapon against the state. Id. at 648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (stating that "transfer of title can impair a takings claim").
204. See id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that "much depends upon whether,
or how, the timing and circumstances of a change of ownership affect whatever reasonable
investment-backed expectations might otherwise exist").
207. Id.
208. Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. See id. at 638 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the land when the regulations went into effect.21 1 Stevens described a
taking as a "discrete event" that can only be compensated at the time
212
that
it happens.
However,
did not
think
this limitation
was related
13
to
whether
the landowner
hadhe
notice
of the
regulation."
III. ANALYSIS
Although commentators were hopeful that the Palazzolo Court would
clarify the proper role of notice in regulatory takings law, the decision
will not have such an enlightening impact. 214 The Palazzolo decision
clearly tells lower courts that notice of a regulation alone should not
defeat a regulatory takings claim, but it offers only minimal clarification
of the role notice should play in a regulatory takings analysis.2 5
A. Palazzolo's Effect on Claims Under Lucas
One important effect of Palazzolo is that lower courts may no longer
automatically consider a land-use regulation as a background principle of
state property law and therefore a bar to a categorical takings claim
under Lucas.216 The Court stated that a regulation does not become a
background principle of state law simply by its enactment or the fact that
title to the land has passed since its enactment. 217 The Court also added
that whether a law is a background principle must depend upon objective
factors, such as the nature of the land use prohibited.218 However, other
than that caveat, the Court merely repeated language from Lucas.1 9
Because the Court found no Lucas taking in Palazzolo, it did not decide
whether the regulations at issue would qualify as background
principles.2
Palazzolo tells lower courts that a pre-existing regulation is not a per
se background principle, but it does not tell lower courts how to
211. See id. (noting that Palazzolo could have sought enjoinment of the regulations,
but he had no right to compensation for the value of property taken from someone else).
212 Id. at 638-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213. id. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. See, e.g., Radford & Breemer, supra note 72, at 452; Eagle, supra note 159, at 193.
215. See Palazzolo,533 U.S. at 632.
216. See id. at 629-30 ("It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of
the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title.").
217. Id.
218. Id. at 630.
219. Id. (citing Lucas' definition of background principles as "those common, shared
understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State's legal tradition").
220. Id. at 629.
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complete the analysis of when a pre-existing regulation is a background
principle.21 This shortcoming of the Palazzolo decision means that the
notice rule may still have life when the pre-existing regulation can fit into
the still-vague definition of a background principle. For example, in the
1994 case of Hunziker v. State,22 the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a
state law prohibiting disinterment of ancient human remains did not
effect a taking of plaintiffs' land under Lucas.2 The law at issue had
been in effect more than ten years before plaintiffs bought the land, and
its purpose was to preserve ancient human remains with historical or
Given that the law
scientific significance to the state or the country.2
had been in effect for a decade and that Iowa is not the only state to pass
a law protecting buried human remains with historical significance,2 the
Iowa law could be within Palazzolo's definition of a background
principle as "common, shared understandings of permissible limitations
derived from a State's legal tradition." 226
A similar problem is raised by Kim v. City of New York, 227' where the
Court of Appeals of New York held that the city's placing side fill on
more than 2,000 square feet of the plaintiffs' property did not constitute a
The court found that the regulation authorizing the city's
taking.
action had its roots in New York's common law. 29 It is not unusual for a
land-use regulation to have a common-law basis.23° Such common-law
based regulation would arguably fit within the Palazzolo Court's
definition of a background principle of state law.3' Although Palazzolo
may dictate a different result where the regulation challenged is
relatively new and is not derived from some common understanding of

221. Id. at 629-30.
222. 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994).
223. Id. at 371.
224. Id. at 370.
225. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 872.05 (2002); Iowa § 263B.7 (2002); La. R.S. § 8:681 (2003);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 11-6-107 (2002); Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(l)(a) (2003).
226. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30).
227. 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
22& Id. at 314 (concluding that plaintiff's title did not encompass the alleged property
taken because there was an obligation of lateral support to the public roadway).
229. Id. at 316 (applying rules of common law and New York City's charter).
230. See, e.g., Colo. Dep't of Health v. Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994) (stating
that regulations regarding radioactive materials would be lawful under Colorado's
common law of nuisance); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Ore.
1993) (finding that a regulation, under which the city denied a permit to build a privacy
wall on oceanfront property, was based on the common law public trust doctrine).
231. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
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the state's power to regulate private property, lower courts will be able to
continue to apply the notice rule in many cases.
B. Effect on the Penn Central Analysis

The Court's opinion in Palazzolo barely touches on investment-backed
expectations, except to say that Palazzolo's claim under Penn Central is
not barred solely by the fact that he acquired title after the challenged
regulations went into effect.32 The only extensive discussion of the Penn
Central takings analysis appears in Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 3 It
is unfortunate the Court did not include O'Connor's analysis in the
majority opinion because most of the Justices noted that they agreed
with O'Connor's understanding of the role of notice in investmentbacked expectations.3 Thus, the consensus seemed to be that notice is
relevant but not dispositive to a Penn Central taking analysis. 35 Justice
O'Connor also urged that the investment-backed expectations factor
cannot be dispositive in a Penn Central analysis. 3 She reaffirmed that
courts must also consider the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and the character of the governmental action. 37 Including such
comments in the majority opinion would have given lower courts clearer
direction in appraising the role that notice should play in the landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Even if O'Connor's analysis had been incorporated into the majority
decision, courts would not be prevented from finding that notice of a
regulation prevents the landowner from challenging the regulation as a
taking because O'Connor's opinion still leaves room for notice to be a
prevailing consideration.-" For example, in District Intown Properties
Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia,239 the court found that the
232 See id.
233. See id. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
234. See id. at 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I would, at a minimum, agree with
Justice O'Connor ... that transfer of title can impair a takings claim."); id. at 654-55
(Breyer, J.,dissenting) (noting his agreement with Justice O'Connor that notice cannot
"always and automatically bar a takings claim" and arguing that Penn Central takes such
factors into account) (emphasis in the original); id. at 643 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (stating that had the standing issue been resolved differently, he
would have treated the owner's notice as relevant, but not necessarily dispositive).
235. See supra note 234.
236. Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The state of regulatory affairs at the time
of acquisition is not the only factor that may determine the extent of investment-backed
expectations.").
237. Id. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. See id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239. 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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appellant did not argue that the character of the government's action
demanded a finding of a taking, nor did the appellant put forth "striking
evidence" of the adverse economic effects of the challenged regulation.m
That left the court to consider the appellant's reasonable investment-

backed expectations, and although notice was an important factor in that
analysis, it was not the sole factor considered in finding that the

regulation did not frustrate the appellants' reasonable investment-backed
expectations. 41 District Intown Propertiesdemonstrates how courts can

consider all the factors mentioned in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, yet
still find notice of the regulation to be a prevailing factor in finding that
no taking has occurred. 42
C. FairnessConsiderations

Although the majority opinion relies on considerations of fairness in
reaching the holding that post-regulation acquisition of land is not fatal
to a takings claim, it fails to fully consider the balancing of public and

private interests this issue raises. 243 The majority states that it is unfair to
bar landowners from challenging a regulation but does not consider
whether it is fair to require the public to compensate landowners who

240. Id. at 883.
241. Id. (considering the facts that the regulation did not interfere with appellants'
"primary expectation" of property use because the regulation allowed appellants to
continue to use the property as it had been used for the last twenty-eight years; the
proposed development was a departure from the property's traditional use; and the
amount of time passing between purchase of the property and the moment of subdivision).
242. Id. at 883-84. Another case that examined all the Penn Central factors but still
found notice to be a prevailing concern is McNulty v. Town of Indialantic,727 F. Supp. 604
(M.D. Fla. 1989). In McNulty, at the time the plaintiff bought his beachfront property,
regulations required government permission before the property could be developed. Id.
at 605. In subsequent years, the regulations were strengthened to make development
much more difficult, and plaintiff claimed his property had been taken. Id. at 605-06.
Analyzing plaintiffs claim under Penn Central, the court made a detailed examination of
the economic impact of the regulations, the plaintiff's investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the government action. Id at 608-13. Within the investment-backed
expectations factor, the court considered that the plaintiff had not attempted to develop
his land for fifteen years and that his current ability to develop the land was the same as
his neighboring landowners. Id. at 610-12. However, the court paid special attention to
the fact that the plaintiff purchased the land with notice of the regulations, giving that
consideration its own heading in the opinion. Id. at 611-12 (noting that the reasonableness
of plaintiff's expectation was undermined by the fact that his land had been subject to
land-use regulation since its purchase).
243. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that if existing
regulations play no role in a takings analysis, then "an important indicium of fairness is
lost").
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purchase strictly regulated land, hoping to secure a windfall by claiming
the regulations are a taking.
The windfall issue arises from the assumption that land subject to
development restrictions has a lower market value than land not subject
to such restrictions.245 A person could purchase the land at the lower
price, challenge the regulations as a taking, and if successful, either
develop the land without the restrictions or receive compensation for the
lost value of the land. 246 If the state decided to repeal the regulation and
244. Compare Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 (noting the unfairness of a rule that would
bar a takings claim where the steps necessary to make the claim ripe had not been taken
by a previous owner), with id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that if existing
regulations are not taken into account in a takings analysis, some owners may "reap
windfalls" unfairly).
The windfall to the owners would come in the form of the "just compensation" required
by the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause is unique among
constitutional protections because it not only defines when there is a cause of action when a taking of private property for public use occurs - but also identifies the remedy,

just compensation.

JAN

G.

LAITOS,

LAW

OF PROPERTY

RIGHTS PROTECTION:

LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 17.02, at 17-3 (1999). Since the 1987 case
of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987), it has been clear that the duty to compensate exists in a regulatory taking just as it
does when the government exercises its eminent domain power. Id. at 17-5. Because most
laws being challenged as regulatory takings do not provide for compensation to the
property owner, the courts must compute the amount of compensation that is "just." Id. §
17.03, at 17-5, 17-6. The constitutional standard for compensation is the fair market value
of the property at the time of the taking. Id. at 17-7 (noting that the value is determined
by the trier of fact). When there is a partial taking - a substantial diminution in value as
opposed to a complete deprivation of value - the "before and after" rule applies, and the
owner receives the difference between the fair market value of the entire property before
the taking and the fair market value of the remainder after the taking. Id. at 17-8. If the
taking is total, i.e., a Lucas taking, then the property owner receives the fair market value
for the highest and the best use of the property before the government regulation. See id.
at 17-10.
245. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). An example of the windfall
situation is presented in Professor Michelman's article:
Suppose I buy scenic land along the highway during the height of public
discussion about the possibility of forbidding all development of such land, and
the market clearly reflects awareness that future restrictions are a significant
possibility. If restrictions are ultimately adopted, have I a claim to be
compensated in the amount of the difference between the land's value with
restrictions and its value without them? Surely this would be a weak claim. I
bought land which I knew might be subjected to restrictions; and the price I paid
should have been discounted by the possibility that restrictions would be
imposed. Since I got exactly what I meant to buy, it perhaps can be said that
society has effected no redistribution so far as I am concerned, any more than it
does when it refuses to refund the price of my losing sweepstakes ticket.
Michelman, supra note 73, at 1238 (footnote omitted).
246. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). When a court finds that a
regulation effects a taking and the property owner is due compensation, the government
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the landowner was able to develop the property, this transaction would

not be unlike other speculative investments where an investor took a risk
that turned out to be profitable.2 47 However, if the state chose to keep

the regulation in place and compensate the landowner, the landowner
would be compensated for the value of his land without the regulations,

which presumably would be higher than what he originally paid.M As a
result, the landowner would be enriched at the public's expense.249

Forcing the public to bear a burden that may be more properly borne by
the individual landowner goes against the basic rationale underlying
regulatory takings.2' 0 Under Palazzolo, this imbalance between the
public as a whole and an individual landowner remains a possibility.
IV. CONCLUSION

In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to make clear
the role that notice should play in regulatory takings determinations. By

instead promulgating a "notice should not be dispositive" rule, the Court
missed its chance to clarify the issue. Aside from the questions of
fairness that such a rule raises, removing notice as a dispositive factor in
takings claims will foster inefficiency. Because the Supreme Court
refused to further define the background principle exception to Lucas, or

state whether notice of a regulation is a consideration in the property
owner's investment-backed expectations, lower courts will likely
continue to apply the notice rule, albeit not as a per se bar to a takings

claim.

has the choice of either leaving the offending regulation in place, thereby making the
taking permanent and compensating the property owner accordingly, or repealing the
regulation as applied and limiting the compensation owed to the property owner to the
value lost while the regulation was in place. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church,
482 U.S. at 319.
247. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing such an
occurrence as similar to "the windfalls that occur every day at stock exchanges or antique
auctions, where the knowledgeable.., profit at the expense of the ignorant").
248. See discussion of compensation principles, supra note 244. For a discussion of
possible windfalls in the regulatory takings context, see Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v. City of
Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that the plaintiff bought the property,
which was subject to a nonconforming use, at a bargain price and has made considerable
profit off of it); Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 319 (N.Y. 1997) (identifying the
possibility that plaintiffs could receive a reduction in the purchase price of the property
because of the regulation and then receive compensation because the regulation was
enforced).
249. Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 319.
250. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
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V. ADDENDUM

Since this Article was written, courts have had an opportunity to
interpret Palazzolo's impact on regulatory taking claims in which
landowners had notice of regulations at the time of purchase. True to
the spirit of Palazzolo, courts have not allowed notice of a regulation to
bar the landowner's taking claim.2
However, some courts, especially the Federal Circuit, have
incorporated Justice O'Connor's concurrence into their analyses of
plaintiffs' reasonable investment-backed expectations. 2 2 In Rith Energy,
Inc. v. United States, 3 the Federal Circuit specifically refused to ignore

the fact that plaintiff purchased its mining leases with notice that the
government could revoke plaintiff's mining permit.2
As O'Connor
advised, the court examined all three Penn Central factors but ultimately
found that there was no taking under Penn Central.25
Palazzolo's impact on categorical Lucas takings is less clear. In
EsplanadeProperties, LLC v. City of Seattle, decided about a year after

Palazzolo, the court found that a pre-existing regulation was a
background principle of law.26 The regulations and laws pursuant to
which the city denied plaintiffs' plans to develop shoreline were a
reflection of the state's public trust doctrine, and thus they did not effect

251. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1350 n.23 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Rucci v. City of Eureka, 231 F. Supp.2d 954, 956-57 (E.D. Mo. 2002); State ex. rel
Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ohio 2002).
252. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 207 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting
that the Palazzolo Court did not suggest that the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of persons operating in a highly regulated endeavor are not relevant to the
Penn Central analysis); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1350
n.23 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("As Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo makes
clear.., the regulatory environment at the time of the acquisition of the property remains
both relevant and important in judging reasonable expectations.").
253. 207 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
254. Id. at 1350-51. Rith Energy, decided in November of 2001, was a petition for the
rehearing of a case decided before Palazzolo was issued. Id. at 1348. Rith Energy owned
coal mining leases and, under federal law, needed to have a permit to mine the coal. Id. at
1348-49. The government suspended and ultimately revoked Rith Energy's mining
permit, causing the value of its mining leases to decrease by ninety-one percent. Id. at
1349. In the original hearing of the case, the court considered the fact that Rith Energy
acquired the leases after 1977, the date the relevant legislation was passed. Id at 1350.
On the petition for rehearing, Rith Energy argued that under Palazzolo, it was improper
for the court to have considered this fact in determining Rith Energy's investment-backed
expectations. Id. The court rejected this argument, citing Justice O'Connor's Palazzolo
concurrence. Id
255. Id. at 1352.
256. Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002).
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a taking of plaintiffs' property. 7 While the case illustrates how a preexisting regulatory scheme can be considered a background principle, 2 8
the case itself does not cite to Palazzolo or discuss whether the fact that
plaintiffs' land was subject to regulation at the time of purchase was
relevant in its analysis.2 9

257. Id. at 986.
258. See supra notes 216-32 and accompanying text.
259. See EsplanadeProperties,307 F.3d at 985-87.
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